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With Reconstruction entering its tenth year in 1875, plans were underway in Philadelphia 
for a gala event to mark the following year’s national centennial. Opening ceremonies would 
feature a choral cantata with music by Northerner Dudley Buck and words by Southerner and 
former Confederate soldier and poet Sidney Lanier. This collaboration between North and South 
was deliberately meant to symbolize the national unity that Reconstruction had so far failed to 
restore.1 Lanier’s poem “The Centennial Meditation of Columbia,” or the Centennial Cantata, 
asserts national continuity by personifying America as a single entity, the goddess Columbia, 
whose declaration “I was: I am: and I shall be” asserts a national will to endure.2 Lanier was not 
the only poet, however, to mark the centennial, for Walt Whitman’s 1876 “Preface” also 
references “the Centennial at Philadelphia,” describing Leaves of Grass as “my contribution and 
outpouring to celebrate . . . the first Centennial of our New World Nationality.”3 Both Lanier and 
Whitman, then, seize the centennial moment to look beyond civil war toward national unity.  
In doing so, however, each poet provides a different account of the nation’s history. 
Whitman invokes the Revolution of 1776 to celebrate a “New World Nationality” that coincides 
with “the Hundred Years’ life of the Republic” (LG, 751). Figuring the Revolution as a national 
birth, he asserts: “[A]ll the hitherto experience of The States, their first Century, has been but 
preparation, adolescence—and . . . This Union is only now and henceforth (i.e., since the 
Secession war) to enter on its full Democratic career” (LG, 750). In contrast to this account of 
national maturation, Lanier’s Columbia announces not progress but stasis. The line “I was: I am: 
and I shall be” echoes assertions of divine permanence in the Bible’s Old and New Testaments,4 
and the poem itself supports such permanence by reaching back to a time well before the 
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Revolution when “Jamestown” and “Plymouth” first struggled against “Famine” and “War” 
(“CMC,” 61). Thus Whitman’s narrative of maturation—the struggle of American patriots to free 
themselves from the British and pursue a “Democratic career”—contrasts with Lanier’s narrative 
of perpetuation, in which British settlers struggle to extend the ways of the Old World into the 
New.  
Bound up with these different narratives of national history are different approaches to 
poetic form. “[M]y form,” writes Whitman, “has strictly grown from my purports and facts, and 
is the analogy of them”—that is, free verse is the “analogy” of “a revolutionary age” (LG, 755). 
For Lanier, the Centennial Cantata’s form involves “the short, sharp, vigorous Saxon words 
[that] broke, rather than fell, from the lips of the chorus”5—and these are not “analogies” of the 
Revolution but relics of a prior civilization: “[T]he author desiring to experiment upon the 
quality of tone given out by choral voices when enunciating Saxon words, as compared with that 
from smoother Latin derivatives, wrote his poem almost entirely in the former” (“CC,” 272). 
Thus, while Whitman’s centennial writings link poetic form to America’s revolutionary origins 
(“Out of the Hundred Years just ending . . . my Poems too have found genesis” [LG, 756]), 
Lanier derives the formal features of his Centennial Cantata from a source that predates both the 
Revolution and colonization—from the “abrupt vocables” of Anglo-Saxon (“CC,” 273).  
By insisting on Anglo-Saxon sounds in the text of his cantata, Lanier redirects the force 
of the line “I was: I am: and I shall be,” for although spoken by the New World’s goddess 
Columbia, these are Old World sounds. And it is this focus on sounds, I will argue, that 
underwrites Lanier’s break from Whitman’s “New World Nationality.” Where Whitman asserts 
an “Indissoluble Union” (LG, 747), Lanier’s concern is the sounds of Anglo-Saxon; where 
Whitman’s poetic form underwrites an American nation, Lanier’s embodies an Anglo-Saxon 
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race. This difference between racial and national forms extends beyond these two writers and 
into the late-century work of Antonín Dvořák and W. E. B. DuBois. Although the 1890s posed 
different challenges to the integrity of the nation’s identity, replacing Reconstruction’s problem 
of overcoming sectional division with the problem of assimilating newly arrived immigrants, 
Dvořák and DuBois nevertheless consolidate a people by reproducing their predecessors’ 
reliance on form: Dvořák repeats Whitman’s emphasis on the forms of a New World nation and 
DuBois follows Lanier’s reliance on those of an Old World race—not the Anglo-Saxon but, to 
use DuBois’s term, the Negro race.  
By linking Lanier’s and DuBois’s commitments to racial forms, I will demonstrate that 
their categories of Anglo-Saxon and Negro are structurally identical, each relying on racialized 
sound. What this similarity suggests is that the commitment to race-specific sound was not just to 
what Houston Baker has called “African sound” and Eric Sundquist “a sound that is . . . Pan-
African”—but it was also, and initially, to Pan-Anglo-Saxon sound.6 Moreover, by questioning 
the plausibility of such panracial sound, whether Anglo-Saxon or Negro, I will show that relying 
on form to do the work of racial identity ultimately amounts to an act of arbitrary imposition, one 
that appropriates literary form to the project of underwriting the racial politics emerging in the 
postbellum United States. Finally, I will show that this racialist approach to sound substantially 
alters the cultural significance of poems, shifting the focus from the meanings they convey to the 
sounds—and thus the races—they embody.  
 
I.  From Words to Music  
Lanier’s interest in Anglo-Saxon sounds stands apart from other prominent discussions of 
Anglo-Saxon in the United States during the nineteenth century. The centrality of Anglo-Saxon 
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to the curriculum at the University of Virginia (1819), for instance, reflected Thomas Jefferson’s 
aim of inculcating solid citizenship in young Americans who, he writes, “will imbibe with the 
language their free principles of government.”7 By midcentury this educational goal had 
escalated into Manifest Destiny’s geopolitical mission of imposing Anglo-Saxon institutions on 
“inferior” non-Americans.8 A corollary to this expansionist Anglo-Saxonism was an insular 
nativist desire to protect New England’s Anglo-Saxon elite from the influx of supposedly 
“degenerate” immigrants.9 In a specifically Southern version of this insularity, one presumably 
closer to Lanier’s interests, defeated Confederates drew “a cultural analogy that aligned 
Southerners with Anglo-Saxons and Northerners with the Normans,” an analogy that “provided 
comfort to Southerners who believed their region had been unjustly conquered by antidemocratic 
forces”; like the Anglo-Saxons before them, they too would preserve and perpetuate their 
indigenous values, embodied in the Confederate cause.10 While this analogy may help explain an 
upsurge in Anglo-Saxon language instruction in the postwar South,11 such nostalgia for the 
Confederacy runs counter not only to ideas Lanier put forth in the Centennial Cantata but also to 
his other statements of support for sectional reconciliation. Lanier’s interest in Anglo-Saxon 
sound was driven, then, not by lingering sectionalism but by a desire for national reunification, 
and he was able to turn it in that direction through his involvement with two emerging academic 
disciplines.  
The first of these disciplines was scientific philology, which Lanier encountered at Johns 
Hopkins, a research university patterned after the German model and founded in Baltimore in 
1876. Having moved to Baltimore in 1873 to play flute in a local orchestra, Lanier petitioned 
Daniel Coit Gilman, the university’s first president, for an appointment in “Poetry and Music,”12 
and he later proposed a course “suitable to a student of philology who is pursuing Anglo-
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Saxon.”13 Gilman, however, was seeking a specialist in philology; although Lanier was 
eventually appointed Lecturer in English in 1879, in the meantime Gilman arranged visiting 
lectures by William Dwight Whitney, whose The Life and Growth of Language (1875) had set 
out the general aim of the new school of philologists.14 Countering earlier romantic philologists 
who claimed that “words get themselves attributed to things by a kind of mysterious natural 
process, in which men have no part,” Whitney describes language as made up of “signs which 
have no . . . natural and necessary connection with the conceptions they indicate . . . but are . . . 
arbitrary and conventional.”15 Language is ultimately a human “institution” in which “the 
community as final tribunal . . . decides whether anything shall be language or not” (LGL, 280, 
150). This commitment of the new philology to what Kenneth Cmiel calls a “social compact 
theory of language” figures prominently in Lanier’s “From Bacon to Beethoven,” an essay 
composed in 1876, the year of Whitney’s lectures in Baltimore.16 “A language,” Lanier insists, 
“is a set of tones segregated from the great mass of musical sounds, and endowed, by agreement, 
with fixed meanings. The Anglo-Saxons have, for example, practically agreed that if the sound 
man is uttered, the intellects of all Anglo-Saxon hearers will act in a certain direction, and always 
in that direction for that sound.”17 Lanier’s phrase “endowed, by agreement” echoes Whitney’s 
“arbitrary and conventional” signs, demonstrating Lanier’s embrace of the fundamental claims of 
the new philology.  
In embracing these claims, however, Lanier ultimately aims to redirect attention away 
from scientific philology and toward his own, somewhat different, concern: pure sound. If a 
language is “a set of tones segregated from the great mass of musical sounds, and endowed, by 
agreement, with fixed meanings,” then “in the case of music,” he continues, “no such convention 
has been made” (“BB,” 276). Musical tones do not start out as meaningful; on the contrary, as 
 
 6 
part of “the great mass of musical sounds,” they are “wholly devoid of intellectual signification 
in themselves” (“BB,” 277), acquiring meanings only when incorporated into the conventions of 
a given language. The mistake, then, according to Lanier, is to read the effects of this social 
process—the arbitrary assignment of meanings to sounds—back onto the original reservoir of 
musical sounds and assume that music itself is meaningful.18 Thus Lanier urges readers “to 
abandon immediately the idea that music is a species of language,—which is not true,—and to 
substitute for that the converse idea that language is a species of music” (“BB,” 276); language, 
then, is music with a difference—with conventional meanings attached. Moreover, although 
linked arbitrarily to a meaning, tones retain their initial independence from that meaning, and 
Lanier’s aim is to focus attention on this ongoing musical dimension of a language, its status as 
an object not of linguistics but of “Acoustics.”19 Scientific philologists like Whitney, then, 
helped Lanier specify how linguists approach language, treating musical tones as arbitrary but 
meaningful signs, so that he could then set out his own quite separate desire to restore the tones 
of a language to their status as mere sound. Rescuing language’s “musical sounds” from the 
procedures of linguistic analysis marks an important first step in Lanier’s effort to imagine the 
Anglo-Saxon sounds of his Centennial Cantata as a basis for sectional reconciliation.  
Lanier not only separates a language’s musical status from its semantic function, he also 
elevates the former over the latter; to do so, he draws from a second academic discipline, the 
opera theory of Richard Wagner. Wagner’s Beethoven (1870)—which Lanier read and on which 
he commented20—describes the Ninth Symphony as a “choral cantata” (much like Lanier’s 
Centennial Cantata) and asserts that “the music bears no relation to the verses other than it 
would bear to any ‘vocal text’”—that is, the words to Schiller’s “Ode to Joy” bear no special or 
privileged relation to Beethoven’s music.21 Thus the words matter to Beethoven’s symphony not 
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for the message Schiller asks them to convey but for the sounds Beethoven himself uses them to 
produce. “[I]n truth,” writes Wagner, “it is not the sense of the words that takes hold of us when 
the human voice enters, but the tone of the human voice itself” (B, 70). Because Beethoven 
composes with the tones of human voices as well as those of violins and trumpets, this attention 
to tone over sense illustrates, for Wagner (and for Lanier), the general principle that “[a] union of 
music with poetry must . . . always result in . . . a subordination of the latter” (B, 74).22 Having 
praised Beethoven for this innovation, Wagner goes on to compose his remaining operas 
according to this principle of subordinating libretto to score.23  
What Wagner does for opera, Lanier’s The Science of English Verse (1880) does for 
poetry, but while Wagner sees a hierarchy between the libretto and the score that subordinates 
words to music, Lanier finds it within the poem itself—that is, between its words understood as 
Whitney’s arbitrary signs and its words understood as Wagner’s musical sounds. Anglo-Saxons 
may well have “practically agreed that if the sound man is uttered, the intellects of all Anglo-
Saxon hearers will act in a certain direction, and always in that direction for that sound,” but this 
convention is effectively suspended when the sound “man” appears in a poem (“BB,” 276). “In 
fine,” writes Lanier, “when the term ‘words’ is used as describing the peculiar set of sounds used 
in verse, the reader must understand it merely as a convenient method of singling out that 
specialized set of musical sounds made by the musical instrument called ‘the human speaking-
voice.’”24 And for Lanier, “[T]he tones of the human voice are in themselves as meaningless, 
intellectually, as the tones of all other reed-instruments” (“BB,” 280). In the case of “formal 
poetry silently perused by the eye of a reader,” the words on the page are not semantic symbols 
but sound-indicators: “[T]he characters of print or writing in which the words are embodied are 
simply signs of sounds” (SEV, 21). Ultimately, for Lanier, “formal poetry . . . impresses itself 
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upon the ear as verse only by means of certain relations existing among its component words 
considered purely as sounds, without reference to their associated ideas.”  
By abandoning the philologist’s concern with conventional meaning while retaining the 
medium of musical sound, the writer of poetry thus becomes a composer of music. This 1880 
treatise helps clarify Lanier’s 1876 cantata text. Unlike Beethoven’s Ninth Symphony, in which 
the text of Schiller’s “Ode to Joy” is, according to Wagner, subordinate to the music, Lanier’s 
poem is music; Columbia’s statement “I was: I am: and I shall be,” then, does not produce 
meaning conventionally, for as a line of poetry, it is just sound, and as sound, it has no meaning. 
Properly construed, this “meaningless” line tells us nothing at all about the continuity of national 
identity in the United States; rather, it is just being music. Thus the Centennial Cantata is not the 
union of a Southerner’s text with a Northerner’s music so much as a single, jointly composed 
musical score; in that sense, it would seem to provide a more potent symbol of postwar 
reconciliation than a pairing of text and music ever could. Instead of reproducing the distinction 
between North and South in the difference between text and music, it replaces that distinction 
with an internally unified national artifact—one medium for one United States.  
From Music to Race  
To describe the Centennial Cantata as national music, however, is to overlook Lanier’s 
concern with race, which emerges as he distances himself from contemporary debates on proper 
usage. Whitney, among others, used his philological findings to critique the notion, widely held 
among verbal critics, that “proper” language was the basis of an ideal cultural ethos. If all 
conventions of usage are intrinsically arbitrary, Whitney reasons, then no pattern of usage is 
more proper than another, and thus no speaker can legitimately invoke language practice to claim 
superior standing. This line of argument leads scientific philologists like Whitney to accept the 
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shifting usage and slang so galling to verbal critics, for as Whitney asserts, the ultimate 
justification of any usage, whether refined or slang, is necessarily circular: “‘It was the usage’” 
(LGL, 141).25 A similar turn from the goal of “proper” usage is evident in Lanier’s 1879 Johns 
Hopkins lectures, but instead of merely dismissing usage as Whitney does, Lanier replaces the 
ethos of language users with the ethos of the language itself:  
You may have observed that I sometimes speak of the Anglo-Saxon tongue with that 
peculiar kind of veneration which we accord to a great hero who has fought his way into 
a lofty position through unspeakable checks and discouragements. English is indeed the 
Washington of languages; and when you shall have reviewed with me for a moment the 
astonishing vicissitudes and overwhelming oppressions through which our Anglo-Saxon 
tongue has managed not only to preserve its idioms but to conquer into its own forms all 
the alien elements which have often seemed to tyrannize over it, I feel sure your 
reverence for it will be as great as my own.26  
While “reverence” is central here, it is reverence not for users of proper English but for English 
itself, as a self: by personifying Anglo-Saxon as an entity in its own right, as “the Washington of 
languages,” Lanier makes explicit his impulse in the Centennial Cantata to replace the heroic 
national figure Columbia with his real hero, “our Anglo-Saxon tongue.” Like Whitney, Lanier 
has no “reverence” for high usage over low, but unlike Whitney, Lanier does have reverence for 
persistent identity over assimilation. Thus the ability of Anglo-Saxon “to conquer . . . alien 
elements” and to incorporate them into its “lofty position” is ultimately a tribute to its ability to 
“preserve its idioms [and] . . . its own forms”—to remain itself. Whitney takes for granted the 
fact that “[a]ll living language is in a condition of constant growth and change” and seeks a 
descriptive “classification of the kinds of linguistic change,” but Lanier personifies the language 
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as an entity struggling to resist such change (LGL, 33, 36).27 While philologists describe and 
verbal critics prescribe usage, Lanier sets usage aside altogether to focus on the identity inhering 
in the language itself: despite the changes that Whitney catalogues and verbal critics castigate, 
the language was, is, and ever shall be.  
Lanier does more than praise the language’s heroic self-preservation; his lecture also 
analyzes how it was achieved, addressing what he calls “poetic Form.”28 While Lanier admits 
that the language has undergone the very changes Whitney describes in grammar, pronunciation, 
and semantics, becoming almost unrecognizable to contemporary English speakers,29 in poetic 
form, Anglo-Saxon remains, as he claims here of Beowulf, the same as it always was: “These 
words look strange and rugged enough to you at first; but on scanning them attentively, presently 
you will find one after another putting on a very familiar face and speaking to you with the voice 
of an old friend.”30 This familiarity stems from a “sense of rhythm which is well-nigh universal 
in our race,” something “founded upon the rhythmic practices of the fathers” (SEV, 113, 146)—
not founding fathers like Washington but Anglo-Saxon poets of a thousand years ago. Thus 
while Thomas Jefferson’s Anglo-Saxonism focuses on the legal codes of tribal chiefs (leading 
him to propose two such chiefs, Hengist and Horsa, as central figures on the great seal of the 
United States),31 Lanier’s Anglo-Saxonism subordinates codes of conduct to scansion of poetic 
form, inspiring him to prepare two editions of ancient poetry to introduce children to Anglo-
Saxon rhythms.32 Lanier thus replaces Jefferson’s reliance on Anglo-Saxon legal codes for 
instilling national character with a pattern of sound for perpetuating Anglo-Saxon racial identity.  
Lanier’s The Science of English Verse gets more specific about racial sounds when it 
identifies the formal features constituting the persistence of the Anglo-Saxon race over time: 
“From the beginning of English poetry . . . through all the wonderful list down to the present day, 
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every long poem and nearly every important short poem in the English language has been written 
in some form of 3-rhythm” (SEV, 110). Focusing on an example from the tenth century (see fig. 
1), Lanier proceeds “to arrange twenty-five lines . . . so that the general reader though wholly 
unacquainted with Anglo-Saxon may represent to himself with tolerable accuracy the swing and 
lilt of the original sounds.” Setting the words beneath musical staves, with each staff containing 
the three primary beats of his “3-rhythm,” he provides “directions” for “pronunciation” (SEV, 
114). What results is a “musical map” for reproducing, even in the absence of comprehension, 
“the mighty rhythm which beats through all these songs” (SEV, 118, 112). Commenting on the 
result, he concludes: “[I]n truth I do not know where to look in English poetry, old or new, for a 
succession of words which make more manly music as mere sounds” (SEV, 119).33  
Not only older poems display this race-specific sound; Lanier also finds “the most 
modern English verse tending into the very specific forms of 3-rhythm used by our earliest 
ancestral poets” (SEV, 137). Lanier describes Tennyson, his contemporary, as having “carried-on 
the ancient battle-rhythmus of the fathers,” which “never varies from the beginning to the end of 
what we may call Anglo-Saxon poetry” (SEV, 142, 120). This continuity likewise applies to 
Lanier’s own work. Having composed his Centennial Cantata in the precise forms—the “abrupt 
vocables”—of these Anglo-Saxon fathers, his line “I was: I am: and I shall be” is not only, as we 
saw before, simply being music (rather than being about the United States), it is also being 
Anglo-Saxon. Lanier, it would seem, is less an American than an Anglo-Saxon poet, and his 
Centennial Cantata is less a centennial celebration of the nation than a millennial celebration of 
what he calls “our race” (SEV, 113).  
Yet if words, as poetry, cease to mean and thus become pure sounds, why should the 
designation Anglo-Saxon still apply? If a poem’s sound is just sound, with no institution of 
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meanings behind it, then there is nothing necessarily Anglo-Saxon about it. Lanier himself 
effectively acknowledges this point when he suggests “the simple experiment of substituting for 
the words of a formal poem any other words which preserve the accentuation, alliteration, and 
rhyme, but which convey no ideas to the mind,—words of some foreign language not understood 
by the experimenter being the most effective for this purpose. Upon repeating aloud the poem 
thus treated,” he says, “it will be found that the verse-structure has not been impaired” (SEV, 21). 
If the verse-structure remains intact, then the poem, which is nothing more than this verse-
structure, remains itself. The words of a language like Anglo-Saxon are thus sufficient but not 
necessary to produce these sounds. But why, after separating these sounds from a given 
language’s conventional codes, retain that language’s name? If the label Anglo-Saxon serves to 
specify the institutionalized codes or conventions needed to decipher meanings but no meanings 
are present—if poems are music, not language—then why make reference to such codes?34  
Yet it is precisely Lanier’s assimilation of poetry to music that enables a poem’s Anglo-
Saxon identity. Standing aloof from changing conventions, a rhythmic pattern arbitrarily 
designated as the embodiment of a language’s identity allows that language to appear to be one 
self—like “the Washington of languages.” For Lanier, the heterogeneity of conventions is 
overcome by the continuity of sound, which is more than mere sound in its also being Anglo-
Saxon sound. As such, it remains itself across time, from the tenth century through Tennyson. 
For Lanier, the arbitrariness of casting these forms as essentially racial presents no obstacle; race 
inheres in the formal features of archaic poetry, and the superintendents of racial continuity are 
people like himself, literary scholars empowered by their critical procedures to discern the racial 
identity intrinsic to a line. Poems become a repository for metrical effects that lie ready to be 
disclosed by formal analysis so that they can do the work of embodying the persistence of a race. 
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While Lanier’s application of musical notation to the study of poems has made only a marginal 
impact on prosody,35 of far greater significance, we will see, has been this idea of reducing 
poems to racial music in order to assert the persistence of a race’s identity.36  
 
II.  Lanier’s Anglo-Saxon Whitman  
Lanier’s reduction of poems to music encounters the opposite claim in Whitman’s 
“Eidólons,” a poem first published in 1876 and collected in that year’s edition of Leaves of 
Grass. The poem’s speaker meets a “seer” who encourages him to “Put in thy chants . . . / . . . 
eidólons,” which “Ever shall be, ever have been and are” (LG, 5, 7). Whitman’s line virtually 
repeats Lanier’s “I was: I am: and I shall be,” but while Lanier’s line consists not of words but 
sounds (sounds that do not refer but, rather, embody “the ancient battle-rhythmus of the 
fathers”), Whitman’s line contains words that merely mean, describing without also embodying 
“[t]he entities of entities, eidólons” (LG, 7). Thus Whitman separates the poem itself from the 
eidólon, and his commitment to doing so stems from the poem’s more general adherence to a 
Swedenborgian doctrine of correspondences.37 That is, the poem aligns all physical objects with 
privileged metaphysical counterparts (“The true realities” [LG, 7]), as in the following 
correlation of the physical body with its more “permanent” eidólon:  
      Thy body permanent,  
The body lurking there within thy body,  
The only purport of the form thou art, the real I myself,  
      An image, an eidólon. (LG, 8)  
 
By establishing a correspondence between the “body” and the “body permanent,” the poem 
precludes a conflation of the two entities: “Thy very songs not in thy songs” (LG, 8). But if the 
poem cannot be its own eidólon, its “very song,” it can at least be about such eidólons, and this is 
precisely the seer’s advice. To “Put in thy chants . . . / . . . eidólons” is to make poems that sing 
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“No more the puzzling hour nor day, nor segments, parts” but that, instead, sing about “The 
whole . . . summ’d, added up, / In its eidólon” (LG, 5, 6). To embrace the seer’s advice, however, 
is to turn from Lanier’s practice. For Whitman’s speaker, poems are words instead of music, so 
they merely represent instead of embodying the eidólons that “Ever shall be, ever have been and 
are”; instead of embodying permanence (as does Lanier’s line), they merely report it.  
If Whitman differs from Lanier in distinguishing between the “very song” and the poem, 
he resembles him in equating these very songs with the identity of a people—not Anglo-Saxons 
but Americans. Just as material objects have eidólons, so do nations, and as the United States 
emerges materially as a nation, it releases corresponding national eidólons:  
      The present now and here,  
America’s busy, teeming, intricate whirl,  
Of aggregate and segregate for only thence releasing,  
      To-day’s eidólons. (LG, 6)  
 
In the 1876 “Preface” to Leaves of Grass, Whitman quotes from “Eidólons” to specify the 
general project of all his poems: “The Prophet and the Bard / . . . Shall mediate to the Modern, to 
Democracy—interpret yet to them, / God and Eidólons” (LG, 755). Himself such a “Bard,” 
Whitman writes poems that, as a group, seek to “mediate” the relation between Americans and 
the eidólons they release, helping them look past their selves to see their very selves: “I . . . now 
bequeath Poems and Essays as nutriment and influences . . . to furnish something toward what 
The States most need of all, . . . namely, to show them, or begin to show them, Themselves 
distinctively” (LG, 754). This ambition to “show” Americans their very selves makes Whitman 
the kind of poet the seer suggests, a witness (“as I have lived in fresh lands . . . in a revolutionary 
age, . . . I have felt to identify the points of that age” [LG, 755]) whose poems testify to the 
enduring significance of the United States as a nation. Thus while Lanier features poems that 
embody (and indeed perpetuate by embodying) the sounds of the Anglo-Saxon past, Whitman 
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searches for poems that “show” the eidólons produced in an unfolding American present; thus, 
Lanier’s and Whitman’s poetry opposes racial embodiment in a poem’s musical sound to 
national representation via a poem’s mediating words.  
Whitman’s 1876 “Preface” describes his poems as “my recitatives” (LG, 755) in 
reference to the inspiration he drew from the opera (“But for the opera I could never have written 
Leaves of Grass”38), but his model was the libretto rather than the score, and in his 1881 essay 
“The Poetry of the Future” Whitman explicitly criticizes contemporary poetry’s excessive focus 
on sound.39 Assessing “our New World [End Page 159] Progress,” Whitman laments that “the 
prevailing flow of poetry . . . is (like the music) an expression of mere surface melody,” which, 
while “perfectly satisfying to the demands of the ear,” nevertheless “shrinks with aversion from 
the sturdy, the universal, the democratic” (PW, 2:490, 481). Mere surface melody fails to 
mediate these New World “eidólons,” and like Lanier, Whitman associates this melodic impulse 
with a “current leading literary illustrator of Great Britain” (PW, 2:485, 478)—Tennyson—
whose “verbal melody” shows him to be a “feudalistic” “attaché of the throne” (PW, 2:477, 479, 
477). What Whitman seeks, instead, is the work of “future poets . . . referring not to a special 
class, but to the entire people,” the people of “the great radical Republic with its . . . loud, ill-
pitch’d voice, utterly regardless whether the verb agrees with the nominative” (PW, 2:486, 478). 
This embrace of improper grammar not only invokes contemporary debates about proper usage 
(that is, the distinction between the proper language use of a “special class” and the improper 
language use of the “entire people”), it also superimposes on that distinction a further distinction 
between two nations, between the English (who speak properly) and the Americans (who do 
not).40 Calling for writing that Tennyson “cannot stomach,” Whitman hopes to encourage an 
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“autochthonous national poetry,” “a national poetry which was not English but American” (PW, 
2:478, 484, 481).  
In a rebuttal explicitly targeted at this essay, Lanier equates Whitman’s call for a “loud, 
ill-pitch’d voice” with the “crye” of an enemy attacking “English warriors”: “And so the Poetry 
of the Future has advanced upon us . . . , relying upon its loud, ill-pitched voice.”41 In response to 
this assault, Lanier alters Whitman’s terms: no longer a matter of improper American usage 
attacking proper English usage (a question of national difference), he sees in this confrontation 
Anglo-Saxon forms perpetuating themselves (a question of racial identity). Thus although 
Whitman “shouts . . . of a progress that claims to be winning freedom by substituting 
formlessness for form,” Anglo-Saxon—“the Washington of languages”—nevertheless retains its 
essential forms: “Perhaps we may fairly say, gentlemen, it is five hundred years too late to 
attempt to capture Englishmen with a yell,” for Whitman’s strategy “never yet succeeded as 
against Anglo-Saxon people.”42 It is not that proper usage defeats improper usage (one nation 
defeats another) but that form preserves itself against formlessness (racial form remains itself, 
preserves its identity).  
Indeed, this victory of formal persistence is not so much in spite of Whitman but because 
of him, for according to Lanier, Whitman—despite his effort to write in an English that embraces 
improper American usage—writes unwittingly in the rhythmic forms of Anglo-Saxon. To 
demonstrate, Lanier compares “Song of Myself” to the Anglo-Saxon poem in fig. 1 (see the final 
line), setting lines of each side-by-side in order to show  
that even the form of Whitman’s poetry is not poetry of the future but tends constantly 
into the rhythm of  
        Brimmanna boda abeod eft ongean,  
which is the earliest rhythm of our poetry. . . . For example:  
        I loaf and invite my soul;  
        I lean and loaf at my ease, observing a spear of summer grass.  
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. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
        I doat on myself—there is that lot of me and all so luscious. (“LII,” 54–55)  
 
What Lanier finds in Whitman’s lines are not brash claims but Anglo-Saxon forms, and he 
suggests that Whitman’s best results come when he quits trying to pass as an American poet and 
instead embraces his poetry’s essential Anglo-Saxonness: “[O]n the occasion when Whitman has 
abandoned his theory of formlessness and written in form he has made My Captain, O My 
Captain [sic] surely one of the most tender and beautiful poems in any language” (LII, 39).43 
Whitman claimed that his poems were written for Americans in order “to show them . . . 
Themselves distinctively,” but Lanier’s formal analysis is indifferent to showing and concerned 
instead with being, so he recasts revolutionary “formlessness” as persistent Anglo-Saxon sound. 
Properly construed, the American national poet is in fact—just like Tennyson—a poet of the 
Anglo-Saxon race.44  
The Racial Alternative to Union  
I emphasize these differences in the poetics of Whitman and Lanier to suggest that what 
is at stake in their disagreement is what one might describe as the emergence of a distinctly 
racialist poetics. Whitman could insist on the difference between patterns of usage in America 
and Great Britain because he thought differences in usage were consistent with differences in 
nationality. Lanier, however, equates the American and English languages, insisting both are 
Anglo-Saxon, because he considers their national differences entirely compatible with their 
racial identity; that is, he treats the difference between Great Britain and the United States (the 
difference between two nations and their conventions of usage) as separate from and subordinate 
to the continuity of Anglo-Saxon form. Indeed, for Lanier, differences in usage between two 
nations are as easily overcome as those between two periods in history—all are unified by the 
ongoing presence of racial rhythm. Lanier extends this Anglo-Saxon identity across national 
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boundaries when he claims to find examples of pure Anglo-Saxon pronunciation not only among 
Americans—thus, “many words in Chaucer [are] spelled exactly as they are pronounced by a 
Georgia ‘cracker’ at this day”45—but also among Scotsmen: “[T]he Scotch dialect to the present 
day . . . presents us with many interesting old Anglo-Saxon words in the very forms used by our 
forefathers.”46 For Lanier, the Scots are, from the perspective of race, as Anglo-Saxon as the 
Americans.  
This racialist poetics helps Lanier solve a problem he had posed in an earlier poem, 
“Civil Rights” (1874). Written in opposition to the Civil Rights Bill of 1874, this poem registers 
Lanier’s more general disappointment with the legal measures through which Reconstruction 
sought to reunite the nation.47 It features a Southern speaker who, while conceding that “My way 
was clear to like ’em [the Yankees], and to treat ’em brotherlee,” then complains about the racial 
equality imposed by “this Civil Rights”:  
“Them Yanks had throwed us overboard from off the Ship of State.  
Yes, throwed us both—both black and white—into the ragin’ sea,  
With but one rotten plank to hold; while they, all safe and free,  
Stands on the deck, and rams their hands into their pockets tight,  
And laughs to see we both must drown, or live by makin’ fight!  
For, Jeems, what in this mortal world of trouble kin be done?  
They’ve made this Southern plank so rotten, it will not bear but one!  
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
By God! ef they don’t fling a rope, I’ll push the nigger in!” (PPO, 41–42)  
 
The problem, according to this speaker, is that Northern-backed legislation like the Civil Rights 
Bill places Southern whites, many of whom were already denied civil status because of their 
rebel activities, in competition with newly enfranchised blacks.48 The response this speaker 
envisions, to “push the nigger in,” both offensively and succinctly captures the contemporary 
politics that Eric Foner describes: while the late 1860s saw a “New Departure” in which 
Southern “Democrats . . . proclaimed their realism and moderation and promised to ease racial 
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tensions,” the period after the 1873 depression saw a change as “Democrats throughout the South 
were abandoning the centrist rhetoric of the New Departure in favor of a return to the open 
racism of early Reconstruction” (R, 412, 547). Assisted by Klan violence, this change ultimately 
led to a widespread sense of “Redemption” for whites, and their return to an exclusive hold on 
power.49 More than merely a Southern policy, Redemption enjoyed the tacit support of Northern 
whites as well, for as Foner notes, by 1875, “Northern support for Reconstruction was on the 
wane” and “Congressional Republicans had little stomach for further intervention in Southern 
affairs” (R, 544, 556). They thus permitted a return to “home rule” (R, 581), the 1877 Hayes-
Tilden compromise reflecting implicit acceptance of the Redeemers’ white supremacist 
programs.50 As the Nation remarked after the withdrawal of federal troops in 1877, “The negro 
will disappear from the field of national politics. Henceforth, the nation, as a nation, will have 
nothing more to do with him.”51 Lanier’s speaker proves prophetic: it is now blacks, and no 
longer Southern whites, who would be thrown overboard from the ship of state, and the 
remaining Northerners and Southerners would now stand together as whites—no longer as 
regional antagonists but as racial partners. Taking the initiative upon themselves, Southern 
whites like Lanier would “fling a rope” to Northern whites and replace the regional conflict of 
Reconstruction with the supposed racial unity of Redemption.  
Lanier’s “Civil Rights” anticipates Redemption not only thematically, in the proposal to 
“push the nigger in,” but also formally, in its being “written in the dialect of the Georgia 
crackers,”52 a medium, as we have seen, that Lanier treats as a repository for Anglo-Saxon 
sounds. Thus, when viewed from the perspective of Lanier’s later racialist poetics, this poem’s 
form solves the problem raised by its theme: its Anglo-Saxon sounds already embody the shared 
racial whiteness that would provide the basis of Redemption. Viewed in this way, “Civil Rights” 
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anticipates the racial commitments of the following year’s Centennial Cantata text. The chief 
difference between the two poems, then, is not formal (since both have Anglo-Saxon sounds) but 
thematic: the Centennial Cantata replaces the threat of resistance that “Civil Rights” presents to 
Northern legislation (“I’ll push the nigger in!”) with its own commitment to Anglo-Saxon racial 
identity (“I was: I am: and I shall be”). Placing the North’s “Plymouth” in apposition—and not 
opposition—to the South’s “Jamestown,” the Centennial Cantata gives each region a link to 
white colonial settlement while making no mention of the slave trade or the middle passage. By 
ignoring the connections of blacks to the Old World (of Africa, not Europe) and emphasizing 
instead each section’s shared tie to Old World Anglo-Saxonism, Lanier directs the nation toward 
his own vision of postwar unity. We see, then, the political implications of Lanier’s poetic break 
with Whitman: by emphasizing continuity with Britain over Whitman’s New World Nationality, 
Lanier’s Centennial Cantata does not so much restore the legal Union as it imposes a racial 
alternative to Union, and the celebration that results features a unity and continuity that are 
ultimately more racial than national.  
Dvořák's American Music  
Lanier’s exclusion of African Americans from the American centennial exemplifies the 
kind of treatment the Fisk Jubilee Singers frequently endured. Although the group “sang the 
slave songs so deeply into the world’s heart that it can never wholly forget them again,”53 J. B. T. 
Marsh’s history of the Fisk Jubilee Singers registers the “odious and cruel caste-spirit” that 
confronted the group during its 1870 performances. But Marsh goes on to emphasize that the 
group’s music did much to “break down” such “prejudice against color” and to promote, instead, 
the cause of “social equality.”54 An 1872 concert in Boston, for instance, “was worth more than a 
Congressional enactment in bringing that audience to the true ground on the question of ‘civil 
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rights’” (SJS, 42). This openness proved even greater when the tour left the United States for 
Britain: at the same time that Lanier was writing the “cracker” dialect of his poem “Civil 
Rights,” the Jubilee Singers were receiving special reception in Scotland (SJS, 62), and soon 
after, while Lanier was proposing Anglo-Saxon sounds as the basis of his Centennial Cantata, 
“the great Christian heart of England gave [the Jubilee Singers] a specially fraternal greeting” 
(SJS, 82). “After three months in London,” observes one historian, “they invaded and conquered 
the rest of the British Isles.”55 Capturing Englishmen with a song, their performance succeeded 
where, according to Lanier, Whitman’s “loud, ill-pitched voice” could not.56  
The Jubilee Singers did not limit themselves to conquering the seat of Lanier’s Anglo-
Saxon language, for their success led them to ask the same question about their songs that Lanier 
had raised about poems: “Would the slave songs keep their power where the words lost their 
meaning?” The “where” in question was “on the Continent,” and the answer proved to be a 
resounding yes (SJS, 86). As in England, where “that earnest, evangelistic element in the 
churches . . . prized their services of song as an effective ally in gospel effort,” so too in 
Germany “the same class of Christian people . . . met them with the same fraternal heartiness, 
and rejoiced in this unique instrumentality for bringing gospel truth to the formalists and the 
materialists whom it was so difficult to reach” (SJS, 96). Thus the songs are an “instrumentality” 
for producing a “Christian people,” one that is “the same” despite differences in language, 
nationality, and race—a people, in other words, that is neither racial nor national but 
ecumenical.57 Encouraged by their international success, the Jubilee Singers “decided to 
circumnavigate the globe,” making stops in Australia, Japan, and India. While in India they sang 
at the Taj-Mahal, where “the tones of that beautiful slave song, ‘Steal Away to Jesus,’ . . . awoke 
the stillness of that most wonderful of temples” (SJS, 124, 146). By singing at the Taj-Mahal 
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they effectively accomplished their own version of the passage to India confidently predicted in 
Whitman’s poetry, for by establishing “the spiritual as a worldwide phenomenon,”58 their songs 
became the “international poems” that Whitman had called for in “The Poetry of the Future.”59  
In 1890, “having made the circuit of the globe,” the Jubilee Singers returned to America 
to find, as the group’s leader put it, that they were “no longer free from that prejudice . . . which 
we had not met with in any other quarter of the globe” (SJS, 152–53). What distinguishes the 
United States from other nations of the world is its persistent racial prejudice toward African 
Americans, even despite the achievements of the Jubilee Singers. The notion that the slave songs 
serve as a reproach to American nationality stands diametrically opposed to the claim Antonín 
Dvořák would make about them: “It is my opinion,” he wrote the New York Herald in May 1893, 
“that I find a sure foundation in the Negro melodies for a new national school of music . . . in 
America.”60 Instead of belonging anywhere but America, as the leader of the Jubilee Singers had 
suggested, the “Negro melodies,” Dvořák claims, belong to America exclusively. To Dvořák, 
they are a unique instrumentality for bringing not gospel truth but national identity; the same 
songs whose international appeal had enabled the Jubilee Singers to overcome national 
difference serve Dvořák as a “foundation . . . for” it. For Dvořák, the songs are not ecumenical 
but national, consolidating not a Christian but an American people.  
The question of American national identity became a matter of concern for Dvořák after he 
assumed the directorship of New York’s National Conservatory of Music in September 1892. 
Immediately after his arrival he found himself drawn into ongoing debates about the prospect of 
an American national music. “I did not come to America to interpret Beethoven or Wagner for 
the public,” he asserts. “This is not my work and I would not waste any time on it. I came to 
discover what young Americans had in them and to help them to express it.”61 As this search 
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unfolded, however, Dvořák discovered that Americans themselves were increasingly unsure 
about how to describe their nationality, given the ever expanding influx of foreign immigrants, 
and, in particular, the so-called “new immigration” from southern and eastern Europe.62 Dvořák's 
experience in New York led him to recognize the perspective of those who would argue against 
an American national music: “Because the population of the United States is composed of many 
different races . . . and because . . . the music of all the world is quickly absorbed in this country, 
they argue that nothing specially original or national can come forth.”63 But while Dvořák 
acknowledges this account of a hopelessly heterogeneous nation, he nevertheless continues to 
search for a music that will give it unity:  
All races have their distinctively national songs, which they at once recognize as their 
own, even if they have never hea[r]d them before. When a Tcech, a Pole, or a Magyar in this 
country suddenly hears one of his folk-songs or dances, no matter if it is for the first time in his 
life, his eyes light up at once, and his heart within him responds, and claims that music as his 
own. So it is with those of Teutonic or Celtic blood. . . . It is a proper question to ask, what 
songs, then, belong to the American and appeal more strongly to him than any others? What 
melody could stop him on the street if he were in a strange land and make the home feeling well 
up within him? (DA, 376)  
As potential sources for this American music, Dvořák lists “the songs of the creoles, the 
red man’s chant, or the plaintive ditties of the homesick German or Norwegian,” but “according 
to my estimation,” he concludes, the “most potent as well as the most beautiful among them . . . 
are certain of the so-called plantation melodies and slave songs” (DA, 377), the same music he 
had singled out early in his visit. Dvořák associates these songs not with Africa but with the 
Negro in the South,64 and he casts them as the music of all Americans, regardless of race or 
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region: “These beautiful and varied themes are the product of the soil. They are American. . . . 
The American musician understands these tunes and they move sentiment in him.”65 This 
sentiment is not racial (as with Lanier’s “veneration” for the tones of the Anglo-Saxon tongue) or 
ecumenical (as with the “Christian song” of the Jubilee Singers) but national: “To read the right 
meaning the composer need not necessarily be of the same blood,” Dvořák asserts, since “white 
composers” can write “touching Negro songs” that show a “sympathetic comprehension of the 
deep pathos of slave life.”66 Dvořák himself undertook such an effort in his symphonic 
arrangement of the spiritual “Old Folks at Home,” and he described the resulting work as “purely 
national.”67  
Dvořák, then, envisions an America like Whitman’s, a New World nation distinct from 
its European antecedents. Just as Whitman’s poems advocate a “New World Nationality,” so 
Dvořák has a similar ambition in his symphony From the New World: “My new symphony is . . . 
an endeavor to portray characteristics, such as are distinctly American.”68 In preparing it, Dvořák 
sought exposure to Negro melodies by asking Henry Burleigh, an African American student at 
the National Conservatory, to sing spirituals for him. “It was my privilege,” Burleigh wrote, “to 
sing repeatedly some of the old plantation songs for him at his house, and one in particular, 
‘Swing Low, Sweet Chariot,’ greatly pleased him, and part of this old spiritual will be found in 
the second theme of the first movement of the [symphony From the New World], first given out 
by the flute.”69  
The flute was Lanier’s instrument—he played first chair in Baltimore’s Peabody 
Orchestra—and had he not suffered an early death at age 39, the Baltimore premiere of Dvořák's 
symphony would no doubt have featured him on this solo. The scenario, although hypothetical, 
is worth considering: Lanier, a former Confederate soldier and ardent Anglo-Saxon, performing 
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a Negro spiritual in Dvořák's all-American symphony. Lanier had turned to music to identify an 
Anglo-Saxon race, an alternative to Reconstruction’s ongoing conflict between sections, but the 
hypothetical idea of his playing the “Swing Low” melody suggests that Dvořák's music produces 
an entirely different kind of identity, one that rises above the friction Lanier experienced between 
North and South and blacks and whites, or the conflict Dvořák observed between immigrants and 
natives. Dvořák's effort to transform cultural heterogeneity into U.S. nationality aligns his project 
with Whitman’s: both turn to songs—whether Whitman’s recitatives or Dvořák's melodies—to 
establish a national people in the United States.  
In describing these musical forms as national, Dvořák diverges from the description in 
the book distributed by the Jubilee Singers during their tours. That book’s “Preface to the Music” 
casts the songs as resistant to national designations, like the international audience of the touring 
singers:  
It is a coincidence worthy of note that more than half the melodies . . . are in the same scale as 
that in which Scottish music is written; that is, with the fourth and seventh tones omitted. The 
fact that the music of the ancient Greeks is also said to have been written in this scale suggests an 
interesting inquiry as to whether it may not be a peculiar language of nature, or a simpler 
alphabet than the ordinary diatonic scale, in which the uncultivated mind finds its easiest 
expression.70  
Here the songs Dvořák built into his symphony From the New World are the “peculiar 
language of nature,” not of a nation—the mark of a primitive human, not a specific national, 
culture. In one sense Dvořák agreed, for in a newspaper interview he concedes the formal 
identity between the plantation melodies and the music of other nations: “I found that the music 
of the Negroes and of the Indians was practically identical,”71 adding that “the music of the two 
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races bore a remarkable similarity to the music of Scotland” (DA, 362): “[T]he Scotch scale, if I 
may so call it, has been used to impart a certain color to musical composition. . . . The device is a 
common one”—so common, he continues, that many composers have used it, including 
Mendelssohn, David, Verdi, and Dvořák himself. “In fact,” he notes, “the scale in question is 
only a certain form of the ancient ecclesiastical modes” that “have been employed time and time 
again” (DA, 363)—a mode so common that musicologists continue to discuss it, labeling it 
Dorian,72 which is itself, according to Webster’s Tenth, the name of “an ancient Hellenic race.”  
To Dvořák, these plantation songs are as plausibly Scottish or Greek as they are Negro or 
Indian, yet acknowledging this point in no way diminishes his conviction that they are the basis 
for a music that is distinctively American. This problem of classification raises the same question 
about Dvořák's symphony that I asked about Lanier’s Anglo-Saxon poem: as musical sounds 
devoid of conventional meanings, on what grounds should these expressive works bear the name 
of a specific social group? These sounds may be found in these cultures, but if these cultures 
impose none of their conventional meanings upon them, are these cultures—Scottish, Negro, 
U.S., Greek—in these sounds?73  
A contemporary music critic, James Huneker, raises this very question in his review of 
Dvořák's From the New World. Turning to the first movement’s second theme (the version of 
“Swing Low Sweet Chariot” played by the flute), he describes it as “negro or oriental, just as you 
choose.”74 When Dvořák chooses, he calls it American, and while Huneker implies that such 
choices are purely arbitrary, Dvořák, openly acknowledging the formal identity among these 
scales, nevertheless insists that his designation is the right one. Lanier had taken the same 
approach to the “3-rhythm” of poems, insisting that it was intrinsically Anglo-Saxon. And just as 
sound’s embodiment of a culture was an opportunity for Lanier, helping him unify the 
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heterogeneity of Anglo-Saxon across time, so too it was an opportunity for Dvořák, a means for 
unifying the people of the United States despite an accelerating influx of diverse immigrant 
groups.  
 
III.  DuBois’s African Music  
The orchestras Dvořák conducted figure prominently in another work from this period, 
W. E. B. DuBois’s The Souls of Black Folk (1903). In chapter 13, “Of the Coming of John,” John 
attends a New York performance of Wagner’s Lohengrin; as the orchestra plays he begins “to 
rise with that clear music out of the dirt and dust of that low life that held him prisoned and 
befouled” (SBF, 193). But no sooner has John’s reverie begun than it is cut short. John’s 
boyhood playmate, a white man, is also in the audience and is uncomfortable with John’s 
presence; he requests that the color line be enforced, so the opera house and its liberating music 
are suddenly off limits to John. It was in 1895, the year of Dvořák's return to Prague, that the 
color line received its infamous sanction from Booker T. Washington: “In all things that are 
purely social we can be as separate as the fingers, yet one as the hand in all things essential to 
mutual progress.”75 For John, this separation affects him as much in Georgia as it had in New 
York, and the cumulative insult drives him to kill his boyhood playmate. Lingering by the body, 
he once again hears Wagner’s music, his memory of it blending with the sound of an 
approaching lynch mob: “Hark! was it music, or the hurry and shouting of men? Yes, surely! 
Clear and high the faint sweet melody rose and fluttered like a living thing, so that the very earth 
trembled as with the tramp of horses and murmur of angry men” (SBF, 202). Wagner’s white 
swan becomes indistinguishable from the “white-haired man” with his “coiling twisted rope” 
(SBF, 203). John had initially treated Wagner’s music as a symbol of escape from the South and 
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the color line—as a way to “dwell above the veil” (SBF, 90)—but here the music ultimately 
merges with the white oppressors and becomes, effectively, white.76  
In his next chapter, DuBois explicitly contrasts “the songs of white America” with what 
Dvořák calls “plantation melodies” and DuBois himself “the Sorrow Songs” (SBF, 209, 204). 
Dvořák had predicted that Americans would embrace the Negro spirituals as their “distinctively 
national songs, which they [would] at once recognize as their own, even if they had never hea[r]d 
them before.” DuBois attributes to the Sorrow Songs the same autochthonous power: “[T]hese 
songs . . . . came out of the South unknown to me, one by one, and yet at once I knew them as of 
me and of mine” (SBF, 204). But there is an important difference in the positions of DuBois and 
Dvořák, for while Dvořák imagines as “American” the person who “claims that music as his 
own,” DuBois’s description of the Sorrow Songs as “of me and of mine” is meant to cast the 
listener not as an American among Americans but a Negro among Negroes. This is “primitive 
African music,” he writes, “the voice of exile” in “the foster land” (SBF, 208, 209). Thus 
DuBois’s turn to the Sorrow Songs looks less like Dvořák's search for American national identity 
and more like Lanier’s assertion of Anglo-Saxon racial continuity. DuBois, in other words, treats 
these songs not as an alternative to racial distinctions but, like Lanier’s Anglo-Saxon rhythm, as 
a basis for making them.77 If DuBois’s Sorrow Songs are “of me and of mine,” then others’ 
songs—“the songs of white America” (SBF, 209)—must be of them and of theirs.  
What DuBois might have called white Sorrow Songs can be found in Lanier’s The 
Science of English Verse. Here Lanier quotes a thousand-year-old Anglo-Saxon poem, “calling 
attention to a profound mournfulness and gentle dignity which breathe subtly out of the 
melodious movement of the verse. . . . Even those who understand no word of Anglo-Saxon must 
be deeply impressed with the tender sing [sic] which goes all along through the poem, when it is 
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properly read aloud” (SEV, 123). DuBois offers a remarkably similar account of the Negro 
Sorrow Songs: “My grandfather’s grandmother was seized by an evil Dutch trader two centuries 
ago; and . . . she . . . often crooned a heathen melody [that] . . . we sing . . . to our children, 
knowing as little as our fathers what its words may mean, but knowing well the meaning of its 
music” (SBF, 207). Although “[w]ords and music have lost each other,” DuBois nonetheless 
knows that “these songs are the articulate message of the slave to the world” (SBF, 209, 207); 
loss of meanings, then, does not compromise the standing of the songs as the embodiment of a 
race. Agreeing with Lanier that words can be separated from music, DuBois also agrees that 
these extralinguistic sounds are tied to a particular people. Just as DuBois offers a catalog of the 
Sorrow Songs, singling out “Ten master songs . . .—songs of undoubted Negro origin . . . and . . . 
peculiarly characteristic of the slave” (SBF, 208), so Lanier provides his own race-based canon 
of song: “I have selected out of the body of English poetry five battle-songs, written at intervals 
of three centuries apart. . . . Surely no one can regard without interest this succession of manful 
songs, all moving in exactly the same verse-beat and carrying us on their rhythmic movement, by 
three-century leaps, through twelve centuries of English verse” (SEV, 137). Both Lanier and 
DuBois place their respective Sorrow Songs on opposite sides of a musically based color line.78  
Included in DuBois’s list of “master songs” is “Swing Low, Sweet Chariot,” which 
appears in musical notation as an epigraph to chapter 12 of The Souls of Black Folk (see fig. 2). 
This is the same song that Dvořák gives to the flute in his symphony From the New World, but 
while Dvořák wants to present it as American national music, DuBois, we see, claims it as 
distinctively Negro—not of the New World but of the Old World (African, not European) that 
the slaves brought to America.79 Above this song, DuBois prints a passage from Tennyson. 
Tennyson had been the explicit object of Whitman’s complaint about poetry that is British 
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instead of American, but Lanier had praised Tennyson for having “carried-on the ancient battle-
rhythmus of the fathers”; moreover, as we have seen, Lanier assimilated all poetry to music, even 
placing “the alphabet on exactly the same plane with the common European musical system of 
notation.”80 Thus Lanier (if not DuBois himself) would have viewed this epigraph from 
Tennyson as nothing more than musical notation for an Anglo-Saxon song. From Lanier’s 
perspective, then, DuBois’s page presents us with two adjacent instances of sound notation; no 
words, only music. But they are not simply two songs; they are, according to Lanier and DuBois, 
an Anglo-Saxon song and a Negro song.  
While DuBois may not have shared Lanier’s investment in reducing Tennyson’s poems 
to Anglo-Saxon sounds, he was deeply invested in the blackness of the Sorrow Songs: “We are 
that people whose subtle sense of song has given America its only American music,” DuBois 
wrote in “The Conservation of Races” (1897).81 But this is not “American music” in the Dvořák 
sense, for while Dvořák had envisioned a single music for a unified New World nation, DuBois 
asserts of “the Negro people” that “their destiny is not absorption by the white Americans” 
(“CR,” 23). Seeking to avoid such racial “self-obliteration,” DuBois imagines “200,000,000 
black hearts beating in one glad song of jubilee” (“CR,” 24, 23). Race is conserved, then, through 
the racial identity inherent in these sounds, sounds that were, are, and ever shall be.82 The 
question, then, is not whether the jubilee songs are intrinsically racial but whether the race they 
embody is one’s own—whether they are “of me and of mine”—and whether one will choose to 
acknowledge them as such. On this point DuBois’s instruction is clear: “[I]t is our duty to 
conserve . . . our spiritual ideals; as a race we must strive” toward “that broader humanity”—that 
cultural pluralism—“which freely recognizes differences in men, but sternly deprecates 
inequality in their opportunities of development” (“CR,” 25). Difference among races is 
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something DuBois “freely recognizes” so long as its effect on cultural resources is not to restrict 
access to them (such as excluding John from the Wagner concert) but to regulate how people 
identify with them. If no one is socially barred from hearing these songs, some are racially barred 
from identifying with them and others are racially required—“it is our duty” (“CR,” 25)—to 
view them as “of me and of mine.”  
DuBois opposed Booker T. Washington’s call for “separation” in “all things purely 
social,” but he doesn’t eliminate the color line so much as displace it, transporting it from a 
social context to a literary one, making sounds—and, by extension, the people whose sounds 
they are—seem “as separate as the fingers” of a hand. In 1876 Whitman heralds an American 
nation emerging from civil war to embark upon its “full Democratic career,” and in 1895 Dvořák 
proposes the musical forms on which such a “New World Nationality” will be based. Lanier and 
DuBois, however, subordinate American national identity to racial identity, and their respective 
commitments to Anglo-Saxon and Negro music together inscribe within literary form what 
would become “the problem of the Twentieth Century,” the problem of the color line (SBF, 1).  
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however, that in the writers of this period, the domain of sheer sound is providing a new 
opportunity to assert the existence of race, whether Anglo-Saxon or Negro. Although Sundquist 
denies that his own account of DuBois is “a brief for Afrocentrism” (15), he is generally more 
appreciative than critical as he repeatedly highlights DuBois’s assertions of sound as intrinsically 
African (472, 511, 525–39). Houston Baker shares Sundquist’s commitment to identifying a 
specifically African American sound in The Souls of Black Folk (Modernism and the Harlem 
Renaissance, 56–68). Shamoon Zamir likewise takes race to be “embodied” in the spirituals 
(Dark Voices: W. E. B. Du Bois and American Thought, 1888–1903 [Chicago: Univ. of Chicago 
Press, 1995], 170, 171, 172, 175), but he sees the spirituals less as a vehicle for consolidating 
racial identity (“an essentialized idea of communitas” [181]) than as a vehicle for DuBois’s own 
autobiographical narrative of “self-transformation” (184). Paul Gilroy recognizes that DuBois 
installs “slave music . . . in its special position of privileged signifier of black authenticity,” but 
he goes on to “resist . . . the idea that an untouched, pristine Africanity resides inside these 
forms” (The Black Atlantic: Modernity and Double Consciousness [Cambridge: Harvard Univ. 
Press, 1993], 91, 101). For a similar statement of resistance, see Ronald M. Radano, “Soul Texts 
and the Blackness of Folk,” Modernism/Modernity 2 (January 1995): 84.  
79. This melody undoubtedly came to the United States from Africa (see Sundquist, To Wake the 
Nations, 519–20), but the question of its provenance is not the same as the question of its 
essence, and it is this latter question—the question of what people, if any, the song embodies—
that I am addressing here.  
80. Lanier, “Lecture XVI: Pronunciation of Shakspere’s Time,” Shakspere and His Forerunners, 
ed. Malone, 169.  
81. DuBois, “The Conservation of Races,” in W. E. B. Du Bois: A Reader, ed. David Levering 
Lewis (New York: Henry Holt, 1955), 25; further references to this source will be to this edition 
and will be cited parenthetically in the text as “CR.”  
82. Anthony Appiah and Ross Posnock have shown that in his later career DuBois sought to 
achieve something Lanier never imagined: abandoning race as a central category of social 
organization. While Appiah argues that this effort failed and Posnock counters that it succeeded, 
they agree that DuBois’s early writings set out the commitment to race from which he would 
later seek to retreat. It is these early writings and their commitment to “the unifying ideal of 
Race” that I am addressing here (SBF, 11); see Anthony Appiah, “The Uncompleted Argument: 
Du Bois and the Illusion of Race,” in “Race,” Writing, and Difference, ed. Henry Louis Gates Jr. 
(Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1985), 21–37; and Ross Posnock, Color & Culture: Black 
Writers and the Making of the Modern Intellectual (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1998), 88–
89, 18–19.  
 
